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Only Your Lawyer Knows for Sure: A
Proposal for Insulating Civil Clients from
Attorney Misfeasance
"We believe it is a duty to champion all fundamental rights
under the law, but we recognize a special trust and competence to
safeguard every man's right to fair trial, on which every other right
is dependent." 1
I. Introduction
Though some individuals are "sophisticated enough in the af-
fairs of the world to be able to select the good from the bad among
[the] mass of lawyers throughout the country,"' most individuals,
unfortunately, are not.3 Courts, however, have been traditionally un-
willing to insulate the unsuspecting client from the acts of his legal
representative. Clients often suffer disastrous penalties because of at-
torney misfeasance. In the most severe instances, a litigant may lose
the opportunity to have the merits of his case heard and justice is
denied. Thus, an individual who is guilty of no more than presuming
the competence of his attorney suffers grave consequences.' In turn,
I. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: How TO CHOOSE AND USE
ONE 4 (1978) (quoting Justice. Robert H. Jackson).
2. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 647 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting). See
infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
3. The following Ethical Considerations in the MODEL CODE OF PROFFSSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY (1982) are relevant:
EC 2-6 Formerly a potential client usually knew the reputations of local
lawyers for competency and integrity and therefore could select a practitioner in
whom he had confidence. This traditional selection process worked well because
. . . the choice was an informed one.
EC 2-7 Changed conditions, however, have seriously restricted the effective-
ness of the traditional selection process. Often the reputations of lawyers are not
sufficiently known to enable laypersons to make intelligent choices. [footnote
omitted] The law has become increasingly complex and specialized. Few lawyers
are willing and competent to deal with every kind of legal matter, and many
laypersons have difficulty in determining the competence of lawyers to render
different types of legal services. The selection of legal counsel is particularly
difficult for transients, persons moving into new areas, persons of limited educa-
tion or means, and others who have little or no contact with lawyers. [footnote
omitted] Lack of information about the availability of lawyers, the qualifications
of particular lawyers, and the expense of legal representation leads laypersons to
avoid seeking legal advice.
4. Jansson v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 198 N.J. Super. 190, 194, 486 A.2d 920, 922
(1985).
5. "[f]t seems to me to be contrary to the most fundamental ideas of fairness and
justice to impose the punishment for the lawyer's failure . . . upon the [client] who . . . was
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public esteem for both the legal profession and the judicial system as
a whole diminishes.
A. Public Confidence in the Judicial System is Indispensable
Our system of justice exists to protect rights and to ensure a fair
and just resolution of controversies. The system must not only strive
in every instance to achieve an equitable result, but must also main-
tain the appearance of doing so. In every case the question must be
asked: Measured by the interests of the parties and the needs of soci-
ety, is the result fair?
The public frequently exercises its right and duty to question
and criticize our legal system. The clamor, justified or not, must not
be ignored. It is enough that the public is dissatisfied, for the law
cannot function without public confidence.
Public confidence in the legal system is not enhanced when one
component punished blameless litigants for the misdoings of an-
other component of the system; to laymen unfamiliar with the
fundamentals of agency law, that can only convey the erroneous
impression that lawyers protect other lawyers at the expense of
everyone else.6
In criticizing the law, the layman may be neither analytical nor
rational. Since he knows little of the refinements of our complex and
overwhelming system, his judgments may be based on a somewhat
simplistic view of what he perceives as fair or unfair. He merely
knows that there is something wrong, and he wants it remedied. It is
unreasonable to expect the average American to be proficient in his
analysis of a system seemingly made of, by and for lawyers. If the
law does not work, it is the task of the legal profession to discover
why. The law's complexity and relative inaccessibility to laymen are
attributes which, in part, make it a profession. It is not for the lay-
man to make repairs. Experts must monitor experts.
This comment does not suggest a complete revamping of the
American adversarial system.7 Rather, it's purpose is to examine one
simply trusting his lawyer to take care of his case as clients generally do." Link, 370 U.S. at
643 (Black, J., dissenting).
6. Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119, 123-24 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
7. Complete overhauls of the system have been suggested by several writers. "The first
thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." W. SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, PART II. See generally F.
RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! (1957). Some writers have suggested a non-adversarial
social approach to dispute resolution. See, e.g., A. STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL (1977). Discus-
sion of these proposals is beyond the scope of this comment. In addition, alternatives to litiga-
tion will not be addressed. For proposals in this area, see, e.g., S. JAFFE, NEW APPROACHES TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1978).
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small part of the legal system and suggest ways in which it can be
improved. The comment questions the courts' methods of dealing
with lawyers' misfeasance in the representation of civil clients and
recommends that a new approach be taken.
B. Misfeasance
The term "misfeasance" is used to represent any error, incapac-
ity, misconduct, or neglect on the part of an attorney, including any
want of the knowledge, skill and ability ordinarily possessed and ex-
ercised by members of the legal profession.8 The term does not in-
clude an error in judgment concerning the conduct of litigation when
the lawyer's acts and advice were well-founded and thought to be in
the best interests of the client." Nor does a mistaken opinion on a
point of law that has not been settled by a court of last resort fall
within the definition of "misfeasance" as used in this comment. On
the other hand, a failure to properly attend to the preparation and
execution of a client's case does constitute misfeasance. In this con-
text, "misfeasance" should be interpreted as broadly as judges have
interpreted the term in legal malpractice actions.10
This analysis emphasizes the discernment of truth and the pro-
motion of fairness. The burden of improving the system is placed on
the men and women who administer the system - the lawyers and
courts. It is time to reevaluate the position of the client and question
whether he alone should bear the responsibility for the action or in-
action of his attorney, an officer of the court.1"
C. The Prevalence of Inadequate Advocacy
According to a survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center
in 1977, an estimated 8.6% of performances by lawyers in trials
before the federal courts were regarded as inadequate by presiding
8. Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954). BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
902 (5th ed. 1979) defines "misfeasance" as "[tlhe improper performance of some act which a
man may lawfully do." "Nonfeasance" is the "[n]onperformance of some act which ought to
be performed, omission to perform a required duty at all, or total neglect of duty." Id. at 950.
"Malfeasance" is "fe]vil doing; ill conduct." Id. at 862. The term "misfeasance," as used in
this comment, refers to all three terms.
9. A sound tactical plan that does not produce the desired results is not considered an
act of misfeasance. The action taken does not have to be the best course to follow, but only one
with a reasonable probability of success under the circumstances of the case.
10. For examples of acts that constitute legal malpractice, see 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys
at Law §§ 197-216 (1980); Annot., 90 A.L.R.3D 293 (1979); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2D 5 (1956).
II. Bank of Glade Spring v. McEwen, 160 N.C. 414, 76 S.E. 222 (1912) (an attorney
at law is an officer of a court of justice who is employed by a party in a cause to manage that
cause).
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judges.12 More important, 41 percent of the federal district court
judges surveyed noted that, in their courts, a serious problem of in-
adequate trial advocacy existed.' 3 In an analysis of lawyers grouped
by specialty, private practitioners who represented civil clients occu-
pied both ends of the spectrum."' A large percentage of judges indi-
cated that in many cases the performance of private practitioners
representing individual clients was seriously inadequate.' 5 Only a
small percentage of judges felt that there was a serious problem with
those representing corporate clients.' 6 Both judges and lawyers
thought that improvement was needed most in the planning and
management of litigation, witness examination techniques, and gen-
eral legal knowledge.17 Perhaps the most striking statistic concerns
the consequences of these inadequacies. Both the bench and the bar
substantially agreed that the most frequent consequence was that
12. A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT. THE QUALITY OF ADVOCACY IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS at 13 (1978) [hereinafter PARTRIDGE & BERMANT]. This figure represents a percent-
age of performances by lawyers. It would not be accurate to infer that 8.6% of the lawyers
were responsible for the inadequate performances.
This data was obtained from the report of a study conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center, for the Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States to Consider Stan-
dards for Admission to Practice in the Federal Courts ["Devitt Committee"]. In September
1976, the Chief Justice of the United States, the Honorable Warren Burger, acting in his
capacity as Chairman of the Judicial Conference of the United States, appointed this commit-
tee which has come to be known by the name of its chairman, Chief Judge Edward J. Devitt,
of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The purpose of the research
was to assess the quality of advocacy in the federal trial and appellate courts. Almost 2,000
performances by lawyers who appeared in 848 trials that ended in May and June of 1977 were
evaluated by district judges. Nearly half the performances were rated "first rate" or "very
good," but more than a quarter received ratings that were substandard. Id.
As a caveat, it should be noted that although the attorneys were evaluated on pretrial
proceedings in addition to their performances at trial, the study emphasized the skills only of
those lawyers who went to trial. This eliminated from consideration those attorneys who were
such skillful negotiators that they regularly achieved favorable settlements, as well as those
who regularly avoided trial by giving too much away at settlements. Subject to this limitation,
the figures are probably a reasonable approximation of the level of competency in the federal
courts.
For the final recommendations of the Devitt Committee, see THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, (1979).
13. PARTRIDGE & BERMANT, supra note 12, at 39. Three hundred and sixty-six judges
answered the question, "Do you believe that there is, overall, a serious problem of inadequate
trial advocacy by lawyers with cases in your court"? Id. at 38.
14. Id. at 104-05.
15. Id. (forty-five percent).
16. Id. (eight percent).
17. Id. at 137-64. Within the category of proficiency in the planning and management
of litigation, the areas most frequently mentioned were skill and judgment, both in developing
a strategy for the conduct of the case and in recognizing and reacting to critical issues as they
arise. The areas most frequently mentioned within the category of technique in examining
witnesses were cross-examination, the use of objections, and direct examination. Within the
category of general legal knowledge, the areas most frequently mentioned were knowledge of
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure.
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"clients' interests were not fully protected." 18
In examining the problem of inadequate trial representation,
this comment will briefly analyze the relationships between the attor-
ney, the client, and the court. It will then review the present state of
the law and the philosophy behind it. Finally, the comment will pre-
sent a proposal which emphasizes the realities and practicalities of
the lawyer-client relationship and the complex nature of our judicial
system.
D. The Adversarial System
Modern trials have been described as "battle[s] of gladiator-
lawyers." 19 Clients are involved only tangentially since the lawyer is
the manager of the lawsuit.2 0 Courts attempt to discover facts. At-
torneys, however, strive in a keenly partisan spirit to bring to the
courts' attention only evidence favorable to their clients. This compe-
tition is valuable because evidence is presented which might be over-
looked in an entirely dispassionate inquiry. The partisanship of op-
posing attorneys, however, frequently blocks the disclosure of vital
evidence. This occurs primarily when one side does not perform its
job properly, thus jeopardizing the rights of his client.
A lawyer has the duty to represent his client competently2l and
18. Id. at 16-18. Among a group of 387 judges surveyed, 56% said the most frequent
consequence of inadequacy was that the clients' interests were not fully protected, and 82%
said that this was either the most or second most frequent consequence. Questionnaires an-
swered by 488 attorneys who had tried ten or more cases in federal court within the five years
preceding the survey indicated no substantial variation from the assessment by the judiciary.
Fifty-eight percent said that the most frequent consequence of inadequate advocacy was that
the clients' interests were not fully protected. Seventy-six percent said it was the most or sec-
ond most frequent consequence. Id. at 46-50.
19. Axthelm, This Gun for Hire, NEWSWEEK, March 1, 1976, at 25 (quoting F. Lee
Bailey).
20. Commw. ex rel Bell v. Rundle, 420 Pa. 127, 216 A.2d 57 (1966), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 966 (1966). This represents the traditional view that both lawyer and client are best
served by the professional assuming broad control over the problem. The contrary view is that
both client and lawyer gain from sharing control over many of the decisions. See, e.g., D.
ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1977). The practicality of strict ad-
herence to this latter view is questionable due to the nature of the subject matter. A blind
following of the traditional approach, however, will often not serve the ends of justice. The
client has a certain degree of responsibility and a duty of diligence which cannot be abrogated.
See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
. 21. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY DR 6-101 (1982) reads as
follows:
Failing to Act Competently. (A) A lawyer shall not:
(I) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not
competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is com-
petent to handle it. (2) Handle a legal matter without preparation ade-
quate in the circumstances. (3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
(footnote omitted)
Note also the following Ethical Considerations:
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with fervor.2 2 The advocate:
by his zealous preparation and presentation of facts and law,
enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with an open and
neutral mind and to render impartial judgments. The duty of a
lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the
same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the
law.
28
The lawyer aims at victory, at winning the fight, rather than seeking
to aid the court in discovering facts. Under the adversarial system, a
lawyer's duty is to employ certain techniques designed to present his
client's case in the most favorable light. The business of the advocate
is to win, and for some this means to win at any cost. An attorney
does not search for truth per se. Indeed, his professional obligation to
his client may involve blocking the admission of harmful evidence
regardless of its probative value. For many attorneys trying cases,
truth and victory may appear to be mutually incompatible.
A trial judge, on the other hand, has the duty to protect the
rights of litigants in his court.2 ' Trial courts have not only the power
but the duty to intervene where an attorney's professional miscon-
duct affects substantial rights of the parties. 25 The Judicial Code of
Conduct states that "[a] judge should take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against a . . . lawyer for unprofessional con-
duct of which the judge may become aware. "26 It is also the duty of
courts to prevent abuse of process, unnecessary delays, and dilatory
and frivolous proceedings in the administration of justice.27 "The
duty to hear all proceedings fairly and with patience is not inconsis-
EC 6-1 Because of his vital role in the legal process, a lawyer should act
with competence and proper care in representing clients ....
EC 6-4 Having undertaken representation, a lawyer should use proper care
to safeguard the interests of his client .... In addition to being qualified to
handle a particular matter, his obligation to his client requires him to prepare
adequately for and give appropriate attention to his legal work.
EC 6-5 A lawyer should have pride in his professional endeavors. His obli-
gation to act competently calls for higher motivation than that arising from fear
of civil liability or disciplinary punishment.
22. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1982) reads as follows:
"A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."
23. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1982) (footnotes
omitted).
24. Village of Big Bend v. Anderson, 103 Wis.2d 403, 308 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App.
1981) (discretionary reversal will be granted only in extreme case of attorney negligence).
25. Ennis v. Ennis, 88 Wis.2d 82, 276 N.W.2d 341 (1979) (when attorney failed to
disqualify himself, trial court had power and responsibility to dismiss action or disqualify
attorney).
26. JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT Canon 3B(3) (1982).
27. Beliveau v. Goodrich, 185 Neb. 98, 173 N.W.2d 877 (1970).
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tent with the duty to dispose promptly of the business of the court.
Courts can be efficient and business-like while being patient and
deliberate."2 8
II. The Present State of the Law
In creating a set of standards to guide courts in the resolution of
problems created by the conduct of attorneys, the current state of
the law and the policy reasons behind it must be examined for guid-
ance. A judicial trend is developing toward more liberally granting
relief to clients aggrieved by the activity or non-activity of their law-
yers. A review of a recent decision indicates that this area of law is
in a state of flux, and that rules of the past may not be as readily
applied in the future.
A. United States v. Boyle
The United States Supreme Court recently held in United
States v. Boyle29 that the failure to file a tax return on time was not
excused by the taxpayer's reliance on his attorney. The taxpayer,
acting as executor of his mother's will, retained an attorney to han-
dle the estate and provided him with the relevant information and
records for filing a federal estate tax return. The taxpayer, who was
aware of the deadline, inquired of the attorney from time to time as
to the preparation of the return and was assured that it would be
filed on time. The return, however, was filed three months late, ap-
parently due to a clerical oversight in omitting the filing date from
the attorney's calendar. The Internal Revenue Service assessed a
penalty for the late filing. The taxpayer paid the penalty and filed
suit in district court for a refund. Finding the penalty unjustified
because the taxpayer's failure to file a timely return was due to "rea-
sonable cause,"' 0 that is, reliance on his attorney, the court granted
summary judgment for the taxpayer. A divided panel of the Seventh
Circuit affirmed.," The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding
that such reliance was not "reasonable cause" for a late filing under
Section 6651(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.3"
28. JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 3A(3) (1982).
29. 105 S. Ct. 687 (1985).
30. Id. at 690.
31. 710 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1983).
32. 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1) (1954). This section provides in pertinent part:
In case of failure . . . to file any return . . . on the date prescribed there-
for . . . unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and
not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to amount required to be
shown as tax on such return 5 percent of the amount of such tax if the
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Before Boyle, various Courts of Appeals had reached contrary
conclusions when dealing with the issue of the late filing of tax re-
turns.33 The Supreme Court, however, refused to delve into a factual
analysis of those cases, seeking instead to establish an independent
legal standard which would be "as 'bright' a line as can be drawn. 3 4
The purported "bright line" is that a taxpayer's reliance on an attor-
ney to prepare and file a tax return does not constitute "reasonable
cause" which will excuse the taxpayer from payment of a penalty for
late filing. A taxpayer cannot avoid the consequences of a breach of
duty merely by delegating that duty to an attorney, accountant, or
other agent. While conceding that deadlines are inherently arbitrary,
the Court held that fixed dates are often essential to accomplish nec-
essary results.35
Since timely filing of a tax return involves no particular legal
expertise, the Court found it reasonable that the taxpayer should be
held liable for his attorney's error. The Court suggested, however,
that if the lawyer had erroneously advised the taxpayer as to filing
requirements, the taxpayer might not have been liable for the pen-
alty.-" Thus, bad legal advice, as opposed to simply missing a filing
date, may constitute "reasonable cause" under the statute.
The supposedly "bright line" is not very clear. Boyle raises a
serious question that extends far beyond tax law: When is it no
longer reasonable to hold a client responsible for the action or inac-
tion of his attorney? The Supreme Court has hinted that under cer-
tain circumstances, a client will be insulated from the misfeasance of
his attorney,37 but has given little indication of what standards
apply.
B. The Agency Theory
In the light of an earlier decision, Link v. Wabash Railroad
Company,"8 the language of the Court in Boyle was somewhat unex-
pected. In Link, the Supreme Court held that the district court had
inherent power to dismiss a claim for failure to prosecute and did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing the action when the plaintiffs'
failure is not for more than I month, with an additional 5 percent for
each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure con-
tinues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate . . ..
33. Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 691.
34. Id. at 692.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 693.
37. Id.
38. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
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counsel failed to appear at a duly scheduled pre-trial conference. 39
The Court stated that there was:
certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's
claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an un-
just penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this at-
torney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now
avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely
selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent
with our system of representative litigation, in which each party
is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is consid-
ered to have "notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged
upon the attorney. "40
This view will be referred to as the "agency theory" - the cli-
ent is denied relief based on agency principles that impute the action
or inaction of the lawyer qua agent to the client.4' A principal is
always liable for the act of an agent if the act is within the scope of
the agent's authority. 2 The liability of the principal for the acts of
his agent is not limited to such acts as are expressly authorized, nec-
essarily implied from express authority, or otherwise actually con-
ferred by implication from the acts and conduct of the principal. All
acts within the apparent scope of authority conferred upon the agent,
although no actual authority exists, are also binding upon the
principal.
4 3
39. The action arose out of a collision between the plaintiffs' automobile and the de-
fendant's train. Six years after its commencement, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana scheduled a pre-trial conference. On the appointed morning, the
plaintiffs' counsel telephoned the courthouse and left a message that he would be unable to
attend because he was 160 miles away and was busy filing papers with the Indiana Supreme
Court. Acting on its own motion, and citing earlier delays, the court dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaint with prejudice after the plaintiffs' counsel failed to appear. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 291 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1961).
40. Link, 370 U.S. at 633-34 (citation omitted)(emphasis supplied).
41. See also American Way Serv. Corp. v. Comm'r of Ins., 113 Mich. App. 423, 317
N.W.2d 870 (1982) (noting that the general rule in civil cases is that incompetence of counsel
is not a sufficient reason for granting a new trial - the law regards the neglect of an attorney
as the client's own neglect and will give no relief from the consequences thereof); In Re
R , S _ and T , Children Under 17 Years of Age, 362 S.W.2d 642 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1962) (negligence of an attorney is the negligence of the client who must suffer the
consequences thereof).
42. Zidek v. West Penn Power Co., 145 Pa. Super. 103, 20 A.2d 810 (1941).
43. Miotk v. Rudy, 4 Kan. App.2d 296, 605 P.2d 587 (1980). Often the only evidence
of apparent authority to act on behalf of a client in a certain way is the retention by the client
of the lawyer. See generally, 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 180-81, 190-95 (1980). The rule
is that if there has been nothing beyond a mere employment or retainer of the attorney to
represent the client in a cause, and if the client has not held his attorney out to the opposing
party as having any other power than an attorney commonly has when authorized to take
charge of litigation for a client, the attorney's power extends no further. The question often
raised is whether the act complained of is one normally within the scope of an attorney's
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Adherence to this concept in its strictest sense can lead to severe
injustices, as may the mechanical application of any rule. Based on
the operative facts present in Link, the end result in that case may
have been fair.45 But the case is often cited only for the proposition
that the lawyer-client relationship is merely one of principal-agent. 46
Certainly there are circumstances under which a client is responsible
for the acts or omissions of his attorney. This general rule, however,
is stretched too far when it is claimed the client must always be
responsible.
Fortunately, the effect of the agency theory has been mitigated
somewhat. Although it has been recognized that a client generally is
bound by the appearance, admissions, and actions of counsel acting
in his behalf, the rule has been limited to procedural matters inci-
dent to litigation. 47 The client purportedly retains control over the
subject matter of the lawsuit."" The lawyer cannot waive the sub-
stantive rights of the client without the knowledge and consent of the
client.49 Nor can an attorney compromise his client's case without
special authority. 50
There is no legitimate basis for distinguishing between proce-
dural and substantive misfeasance. It is illogical to relax the rule
only when counsel waives the client's substantive rights, and to fol-
low it strictly when procedural rights are at issue. In both cases, the
result is often the same. The unsuspecting client is out of court "on
[his] heels" 51 and loses the opportunity to have his substantive rights
determined.
power.
44. See, e.g., Seybert v. Robert Lee Pontiac, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
The plaintiffs, husband and wife, were injured in an automobile accident. The couple hired two
attorneys to bring suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania against the driver of the other car. Without the plaintiffs' approval, the attorneys settled
the case with the insurance companies involved and forged the plaintiffs' signatures on two
releases, thereby obtaining checks totalling $5,300, made payable to counsel and the plaintiffs.
The attorneys then forged endorsements on the checks, cashed them, and filed a stipulation to
dismiss their clients' action with prejudice. The attorneys were disbarred but it was impossible
for the plaintiffs to recover any of their money from their former counsel. The trial judge,
relying on Zidek, refused to reinstate the case for trial.
45. Although the Court did not explore the prejudice to the defendants caused by the
delays in detail, such prejudice, if present, would have been grounds to support the outcome.
See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
46. Link, 370 U.S. 626.
47. Reimer v. Davis, 224 Kan. 225, 580 P.2d 81 (1978) (attorney has no authority to
compromise or settle his client's claim without that client's approval).
48. Id.
49. City of Philadelphia v. Schofield, 375 Pa. 554, 101 A.2d 625 (1954).
50. Bank of Glade Springs v. McEwen, 160 N.C. 414, 76 S.E. 222 (1912) (counsel
does not have the authority to consent to a judgment without client approval).
51. Link, 370 U.S. at 647 (Black, J., dissenting).
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C. Excusable Neglect
Some courts have moved away from unquestioning adherence to
the agency theory, and examine the lawyer's conduct to determine
whether or not it is "excusable." While essentially still imputing the
lawyer's conduct to the client, courts make a discretionary judgment
as to whether the conduct is pardonable. In these cases the fault of
the attorney usually is attributed to the client, and it is only when
the lawyer's action or refusal to act is "legally excusable" that relief
may be obtained."' One problem with this approach lies in determin-
ing what is and what is not "legally excusable."
Exemplifying the strong public policy in favor of a shift away
from the harsh agency theory, New York, in 1983, added a new sec-
tion to its Civil Practice Law and Rules.5 3 This section returned to
courts the power to exercise discretion in excusing defaults occa-
sioned by law office failures. 4 Prior to its enactment, law office fail-
ure was unavailable as a basis for relief,55 thus mandating default
judgments when the reasons for a pleading delay were traceable to
omissions or oversights in the operation of a law office. This was true
regardless of the absence of prejudice to the opposing party. 6 The
52. United Imports and Exports v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 43, 653 P.2d 691 (1982)
(attorney's incorrect advice not to answer or resist garnishment proceedings was not excusable
neglect).
53. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 2005 & 3012 (McKinney 1983) provide in pertinent part:
Section 2005 Excusable delay or default
Upon an application satisfying the requirements of subdivision (d) of sec-
tion 3012 or subdivision (a) of rule 5015, the court shall not, as a matter of law,
be precluded from exercising its discretion in the interests of justice to excuse
delay or default resulting from law office failure.
Section 3012 Service of pleadings and demand for complaint
(d) Extension of time to appear or plead. Upon the application of a party,
the court may extend the time to appear or plead, or compel the acceptance of a
pleading untimely served, upon such terms as may be just and upon a showing of
reasonable excuse for delay or default.
N.Y. Civ. PRACT. R. 5015 (McKinney 1983) provides in part:
Rule 5015 Relief from judgment or order
(a) On motion. The court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a
party from it upon such terms as may be just, on motion of any interested person
with such notice as the court may direct, upon the ground of:
I. excusable default, if such motion is made within one year after ser-
vice of a copy of the judgment or order with written notice of its entry
upon the moving party, or, if the moving party has entered the judgment
or order, within one year after such entry . . ..
54. Tehan v. Tehan, 97 A.D.2d 840, 468 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1983).
55. Eaton v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 56 N.Y.2d 900, 438
N.E.2d 1119, 453 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1982); Barasch v. Micucci, 49 N.Y.2d 594, 404 N.E.2d
1275, 427 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1980).
56. Eaton, 56 N.Y.2d 900, 438 N.E.2d I 19, 453, N.Y.S.2d 404; Barasch, 49 N.Y.2d
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relief measure was introduced at the request of the Chief Adminis-
trator of the Courts and on the recommendation of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Practice.5 7 The Committee did not wish to en-
courage negligence or dilatory conduct on the part of counsel, and
saw ample power in courts to deter such conduct without requiring
what amounted to an automatic default in every case." The Com-
mittee left to courts the task of defining precisely what is meant by
"law office failure. '59 Caselaw has not developed sufficiently since
enactment of the statute to ascertain those acts which would or
would not be excusable.60
In other jurisdictions, however, the general rule is that the neg-
lect of the attorney is the neglect of the client, and no mistake, inad-
vertence, or neglect" attributable to counsel can be used successfully
as a ground for relief unless it would have been excusable if attrib-
uted to the client.a2 The question of "excusable neglect" often arises
in cases dealing with time limits for filing certain papers with the
court.6 3 In one instance, violation of Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure6 4 due to a clerical error of counsel was held to be
594, 404 N.E.2d 1275, 427 N.Y.S.2d 732. See also infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
57. Memorandum of the Office of Court Administration, 1983 N.Y. Laws 3014.
58. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
59. DeVito v. Marine Midland Bank, 100 A.D.2d 530, 473 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1984) (de-
termination of what constitutes reasonable excuse lies within the sound discretion of the court,
but it is not the intent of the statute to routinely excuse default or foster noncompliance with
time requirements of procedural rules); Landis v. Weiss, 98 A.D.2d 677, 469 N.Y.S.2d 746
(1983) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating default judgment entered against
plaintiff where such default was caused by the negligence of plaintiff's counsel in failing to
keep abreast of the action).
60. Frascatore v. Mione, 97 A.D.2d 809, 468 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1983) (no justification for
vacating default exists where neglect of action by defendant's attorney was too extreme and
the excuses offered were unconvincing).
61. See, e.g., FED.R.CIv.P. 60(b), which reads in part:
Relief From Judgment or Order
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud,
etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the fol-
lowing reasons: (I) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . . . or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment ....
62. Davis v. Lunceford, 279 S.C. 503, 309 S.E.2d 791 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983).
63. See, e.g., Davidson v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129 (2nd Cir. 1984) (inadvertence or over-
sight of counsel does not constitute "excusable neglect" that might justify an extension of time
for filing papers under FED.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(2)).
64. FED.R.Civ.P. 4().
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within
120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such
service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made
within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without
prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such party or upon mo-
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inexcusable and the court denied relief to the client. 5 In another
case, when the defendant, relying on the advise of his attorney, failed
to respond to a complaint filed against him,6" the court stated that
the issue was "whether a reasonably prudent attorney would have
completely ignored the complaint."67 Others hold the view that coun-
sel's conduct will not be imputed to the client when that conduct is
outrageously in violation of the client's express instructions or the
lawyer's implicit duty to devote reasonable efforts in representing his
client, provided that the client himself is diligent68 in pursuing the
claim.6 9
Courts often have treated a mistake of fact with greater leni-
ency than a mistake of law, since knowledge of the law ordinarily is
imputed to counsel.7 0 One court denied relief when the lawyer's error
of law was caused by mere negligence .7  Relief also was denied when
the attorney simply forgot or intentionally ignored the need to take
appropriate action.72 When conduct could reasonably be character-
ized as gross negligence, or as constituting a willful and intentional
refusal to act, relief was not granted. Counsel's failure to appear at
trial, even after assuring his clients that everything would be taken
tion .. ..
65. Wei v. State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff filed a com-
plaint in an employment discrimination and civil rights action, but made no attempt to serve
either the summons or complaint upon any of the defendants within the 120 day limit pre-
scribed by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra note 64. The plaintiff's
counsel had inadvertently neglected to calendar the 120 day limit. The District Court for the
District of Hawaii dismissed the action and denied an application for reinstatement. The issue
on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was whether the inad-
vertence of counsel qualified as good cause for the failure to comply with the rule. The court,
in holding that it did not, refused to balance the plaintiff's deprivation of the federal cause of
action against the policy behind Rule 4(j) of promoting prompt movement of civil actions
through the federal courts. But see infra note 80.
66. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rapton, 140 Ariz. 60, 680 P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
A default judgment was entered against the defendant because he failed to respond to a com-
pliant on the advice of his attorney, who believed that service was invalid. The court stated
that, at the very least, counsel should have made some objection to service, or filed an answer
raising the defense of improper service.
67. Id. at - , 680 P.2d at 200 (emphasis supplied).
68. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
69. Lynch v. Meridian Hill Studio Apts, Inc., 491 A.2d 515 (D.C. 1985) (counsel's
ignorance of filing deadline for opposition to motion for summary judgment was not the kind
of outrageous conduct which warranted relief for client).
70. Id. An inexperienced attorney, who was handling his first court case, mistakenly
thought that a hearing would be scheduled on a summary judgment motion as a matter of
course, and that he would receive notice of such hearing.
71. DeMendoza v. New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc., 194 N.J. Super. 607, 477
A.2d 454 (1984) (counsel's inattention to his client's cause was not a mistake of law, but
rather mere negligence).
72. Somero v. Hendry Gen. Hosp., 467 So.2d 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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care of, was held to be insufficient grounds to justify client relief.7"
Additionally, an attorney's failure to act responsibly toward his cli-
ents when the attorney reasonably could be expected to do so consti-
tuted inexcusable neglect7 and relief was not granted. 75 When, how-
ever, the action or omission "results from clerical or secretarial
error, reasonable misunderstanding, a system gone awry or any other
of the foibles to which human nature is heir,"7 the court should be
amenable to granting relief.
An illustration will best demonstrate the potential inequity. 77
Suppose that Plaintiff sues Client in a Pennsylvania court for Cli-
ent's failure to pay Plaintiff for work previously done. Client is
served with the complaint on December 13th and immediately hires
Attorney, who enters an appearance on December 22nd. Attorney's
secretary telephones Plaintiff's counsel to request a thirty day exten-
sion of time in which to respond to the compliant. The extension
expires on February 1st. On February 28th, Attorney having filed no
answer or other pleading, Plaintiff's counsel causes a judgment by
default to be entered against Client pursuant to the Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure. On April 10th, Attorney files a petition
to strike, or in the alternative, to open the judgment. 9
Consider two situations. First, when Attorney's secretary told
him of the extension until February 1st, Attorney inadvertently en-
tered it on his calendar as March 1st. Under Pennsylvania law, this
73, Rill v. State Dept. of Highways, 669 P.2d 573 (Alaska 1983). The plaintiffs sued
the state in an inverse condemnation action. Their attorney suffered excruciating back pains as
a result of a ruptured disc, sought treatment in Canada, and did not return until two days
after the day set for trial. The plaintiffs were unavailable for trial due to either work or travel
outside the state, but had been assured by their attorney that they would be represented. The
court proceeded with the trial in their absence. Unable to contact their attorney, the plaintiffs
hired another who filed a motion for relief from judgment some six months later. The court
denied the motion, holding that the failure of the plaintiff's attorney to appear was not excusa-
ble neglect. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed, reasoning that it would have
been prudent for counsel to have informed the court of his condition and departure from the
state for treatment. Furthermore, upon his return, he did not contact the court or his clients.
74. Id. at 576.
75. For a more exhaustive survey of those specific acts of an attorney or his office that
constitute both excusable and inexcusable errors, see Annot., 21 A.L.R.3D 1255 (1968).
76. Somero, 467 So.2d at 1106.
77. This illustration is based upon Horan v. R.S. Cook & Assocs., Inc., 287 Pa. Super.
265, 430 A.2d 278 (1981).
78. PA.R.Cv.P. 1511(a) provides in part: "The prothonotary, on praecipe of the plain-
tiff, shall enter a judgment by default against the defendant for failure to plead within the
required time to a complaint endorsed with a notice to plead ....
79. It is well settled in Pennsylvania that to open a default judgment, the moving party
must show that: (I) the petition to open was filed promptly; (2) the failure to act on the
original complaint can be reasonably explained; and (3) a meritorious defense to the underly-
ing claim exists. Kennedy v. Frank F. Black, Jr., Inc., 492 Pa. 397, 424 A.2d 1250 (1981);
Ruczynski v. Jesray Constr. Corp., 457 Pa. 510, 326 A.2d 326 (1974).
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would be an excusable error on the part of the lawyer, and relief
would be granted to Client.80 As a second example, assume that at
the time of the granting of the extension, Attorney was in the pro-
cess of dissolving his law firm and making arrangements for opening
his new office. In addition, his usual practice of obtaining indefinite
extensions gave rise to a misapprehension that this extension was
open-ended. Under Pennsylvania law, this uncertainty would not be
considered reasonable, for Attorney could have easily determined the
actual deadline. Likewise, his preoccupation with establishing his
own practice would not constitute a reasonable excuse for the
default.81
In both of these cases, the conduct of Client was identical. In
both cases he was innocent of any neglect. Yet in the first, his case
would be tried on its merits, while in the second, he would be denied
any opportunity for relief. The distinction8" is illogical and unfair.83
D. Realities of the Lawyer-Client Relationship
The "excusable neglect" analysis of attorney misfeasance cases
suffers from a second problem even more serious than that discussed
above.8 Courts focus on the action or failure to act of the attorney
and decide whether it was excusable, while ignoring the fact that the
client is the real party of interest in the lawsuit. "Excusable neglect"
analysis completely disregards the realities of the attorney-client re-
lationship. The same is true of the "agency theory"'8 5 analysis. To
say that the faults or delinquencies of a lawyer must always be vis-
ited upon his client86 is to disregard the practicalities of the
relationship.
Some say that the extremely harsh sanction of dismissal should
be reserved for cases when an attorney's conduct falls substantially
80. Johnson v. Yellow Cab Co., 226 Pa. Super. 270, 307 A.2d 423 (1973) (errors of
counsel or clerical errors which indicate an oversight, rather than a deliberate decision not to
defend, constitute sufficient legal justification to open a default judgment).
81. Horan, 287 Pa. Super. 265, 430 A.2d 278. See also Walters v. Harleysville Mut.
Casualty Co., 417 Pa. 438, 207 A.2d 852 (1965).
82. See. e.g., Keystone Boiler Works, Inc. v. Combustion & Energy Corp., 294 Pa.
Super. 145, 439 A.2d 792 (1982). Unacceptable mistakes involve attorney carelessness or dila-
toriness, a failure to act by one who knows its implications, or a deliberate decision not to
defend. Acceptable mistakes involve the misplacement or mishandling of papers through no
fault of the client or his attorney or a clerical oversight resulting in an attorney being unaware
of an event.
83. For a more inclusive list of cases deciding default judgments, see 24 AM. JuR.
P.O.F. 2D 705 (1980).
84. See supra text accompanying note 52.
85. See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
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below what is reasonable under the circumstances, thereby evidenc-
ing a complete disregard for the judicial system or the rights of the
opposing party. 87 Ironically, this ignores the fact that the rights of
the aggrieved client are also being violated in those cases. Certainly
the client's rights must be considered. Conduct evidencing a com-
plete disregard of the judicial system is also conduct evidencing a
complete disregard of the rights of one's client. As the degree of
reasonableness of the attorney's conduct diminishes, so does the
quality of representation of the client's interests.
Lawyers everywhere in this country are granted licenses, pre-
sumably because of their skill, integrity, and knowledge of the law. 8
A layman has a right to rely on the fact that a lawyer is licensed. 9
The client is justifiably entitled to believe that the lawyer has the
ability to handle his case.90 Although the client has a duty of dili-
gence in the execution of his lawsuit, 91 he does not have the duty to
supervise the daily professional services of his attorney. 92 Even as-
suming this duty did exist, few laymen are knowledgeable enough in
legal affairs to oversee effectively the many steps involved in the liti-
gation process. Moreover, the public is generally uninformed about
the abilities of individual lawyers.93 An individual choosing a lawyer,
perhaps for the first time in his life, may happen to choose one of the
best or he may happen to choose one of the worst solely through
chance.
E. A Malpractice Action is an Inadequate Remedy
Some courts attempt to justify the denial of relief to an ag-
grieved client by pointing to the availability of legal malpractice ac-
tions against attorneys.94 In some cases this may be an alternative,
but it shifts the concentration away from the central issue, the mer-
its of the client's case. Rather than focusing on the heart of the mat-
87. Moore v. Emmanuel Family Training Center, 18 Ohio St.3d 64, -, 479 N.E.2d
879, 885 (1985).
88. Link, 370 U.S. at 636 (Black, J., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. Commw., Dept. of Transp. v. Nemeth, 497 Pa. 580, 442 A.2d 689 (1982).
91. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
92. Link, 370 U.S. at 636 (Black, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Link, 370 U.S. 626 (if an attorney's conduct falls substantially below
what is reasonable under the circumstances, the client's remedy is against the attorney in a
suit for malpractice); Village of Big Bend v. Anderson, 103 Wis.2d 403, 308 N.W.2d 887 (Ct.
App. 1981) (an aggrieved party's remedy does not lie against the opposing party in the civil
suit but rather should be sought in a malpractice action against the allegedly incompetent
attorney).
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ter, courts in malpractice actions are forced to use a wide angle lens
to evaluate both the conduct of the attorneys and the merits of the
original lawsuits.95 The primary inquiry ought to be whether a court
should deny a party a full hearing on the merits simply because of
the misfeasance of an attorney.
In reality, the malpractice trial becomes a trial within a trial."
The jury is called upon to determine whether, if the attorney had
acted differently, the jury verdict in the underlying case would have
been different. This means that in the malpractice action, the prior
trial becomes:
[a] play within a play; that is to say, the [previous] trial is
replayed, by reading the record thereof, before the malpractice
jury and witnesses then testify about the things that were done
or not done by the malpractice defendant. It is interesting to
note that, in principle at least ...an action could be main-
tained by the plaintiffs in [the] malpractice case against the at-
torney representing them [there], in which case there would be a
play within a play within a play!
9
7
The burden of proof in a malpractice action will often be signifi-
cantly greater than the client's burden of proof in the original action.
In fact, it may be insurmountable. In the earlier hypothetical, 8 Cli-
ent, as the defendant, had no burden of proof at the initial stages of
the lawsuit. Plaintiff bore the entire burden. In a subsequent mal-
practice action, Client would be encumbered with the task of alleg-
ing and proving: (1) privity based on Attorney's employment by Cli-
ent; (2) Attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty owed to Client; and
(3) that such negligence resulted in, and was the proximate cause of,
loss to Client.99
95. See generally, 14 AM. JUR. TRIALS Professional Negligence Attorneys § 35 (1968).
Regardless of whether an attorney has failed to use the requisite degree of care and skill,
damages cannot be recovered unless his negligence has proximately caused the loss. The client-
plaintiff has the additional burden of proving that he would have been victorious in the under-
lying action, had his attorney not been negligent. This mandates an explanation of "a suit
within a suit."
96. Id.
97. Woodruff v. Tomlin, 423 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 593 F.2d
33 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980).
98. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
99. Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, P.A., 467 So.2d 315 (Fla, Dist.
Ct. App. 1985). See generally, Annot., 45 A.L.R.2D 5 (1955). Most difficult for clients at-
tempting to charge attorneys with liability for negligence has been the necessity of proving
that the damages claimed resulted from the alleged misfeasance. In accordance with the gen-
eral rules concerning proximate cause, before such recovery can be had, the client must estab-
lish that "but for" the act or omission complained of, the claim lost would have been recovered
or the judgment suffered avoided. Accordingly, the client is faced with the difficult task of
proving two cases in a single proceeding.
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Courts do not agree on the extent of the burden which the client
must assume. Some courts require the client to convince the finder of
fact in the malpractice action that he would have been successful in
the original action in the absence of the attorney's negligence. 100 In
these situations, the malpractice jury hears two cases in one. This
forces the jury to decide the issues in the original action without the
benefit of a direct presentation of evidence by all the parties to that
action. The jury's task is especially difficult when the effect of the
attorney's alleged negligence was to prevent the initiation or comple-
tion of the original trial. In such cases, at least some of the evidence
of the opposing party was never presented, does not appear in a trial
record, and is probably unavailable.
Other courts hold that the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action
must establish that, as a matter of law, he clearly or probably would
have won in the underlying action.1"1 In either case, the burden10 2 is
an extremely heavy one, as evidenced by the number of unsuccessful
malpractice actions.10
3
Not only is the aggrieved client at the mercy of a potentially
uninformed jury, but so too is the accused attorney. Questions re-
garding the outcome of the original action, which must be decided
on less than all of the relevant evidence, could easily be decided in-
correctly. 04 The jury in a malpractice case must decide the outcome
See also, Evans v. Detweiler, 466 So.2d 800 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Blue Water Corp., Inc.
v. O'Toole, 336 N.W.2d 279 (Minn. 1983) (to prevail in a legal malpractice suit, a plaintiff
must establish four elements: (I) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) acts con-
stituting negligence or breach of contract; (3) that such acts were the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's damages; and (4) that but for the defendant's conduct the plaintiff would have been
successful in the prosecution or defense of the action).
100. Spivack, Shulman & Goldman v. Foremost Liquor Store, Inc., 124 Ill. App.3d 676,
465 N.E.2d 500 (1984). In a suit against an attorney for negligence, the burden is on the
plaintiff to allege and prove every fact essential to establish the defendant's duty and a viola-
tion of it. The question of whether an attorney has exercised a reasonable degree of care and
skill is one of fact. The standard of care against which the attorney's conduct will be measured
must generally be established through expert testimony.
101. Hyduke v. Grant, 351 N.W.2d 675 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (a court is qualified to
determine the merits and probable outcome of an appeal); Stafford v. Garrett, 46 Or. App.
781, 613 P.2d 99 (1980). To recover on a legal malpractice claim based on alleged negligence
in giving advice on appellate practice and procedure, the former client was required to estab-
lish that he would have in fact prevailed on appeal and to prove that counsel's advice was not
reasonable under the circumstances. Whether or not the client would have prevailed on appeal
was a question of law. Whether counsel's advice was unreasonable was a question of fact.
102. Dorf v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966). In an attorney malpractice action,
there is no presumption that the attorney is guilty of carelessness arising merely from his
failure to be successful in an undertaking. He is always entitled to the benefit of the rule that
everyone is presumed to have discharged his duty until the contrary is shown to be true. The
burden is therefore on the plaintiff to allege and prove every fact essential to establish the
defendant's duty and a violation of it.
103. Annot., 45 A.L.R. 2D 5 (1955).
104. At least one court has gone so far as to call it speculation. See Woodruff, 423 F.
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of the original action, had it been properly tried. The parties can
argue the first case to the second jury. The duty of the second jury
then is to reconstruct what the earlier jury would have done, by us-
ing an objective standard - the probable behavior of a reasonable
jury.105 But since the lawyer-client relationship is a fiduciary rela-
tionship, the attorney holds a significant advantage over his former
client. The attorney knows not only all the material facts concerning
the alleged act of malpractice, but also all those surrounding the un-
derlying action. To protect his original claim, the client must, in ef-
fect, waive the attorney-client privilege and risk publication of confi-
dential and potentially embarrassing information. This deters clients
from pursuing malpractice suits.
To recover money damages from his former attorney, the client
must establish actual losses sustained as a consequence of the law-
yer's negligence. The recovery sought is usually the value of the
claim in the preceding suit if the client was a plaintiff in that action,
or, if he was a defendant, the amount of the judgment imposed upon
him. The client, however, must show an actual monetary loss. 106 This
could prove to be difficult if, in the original action, the client sought
equitable relief, even though he need only prove the fact of damages
and not the amount.10 7 Of course, if the damages at law were inade-
quate in the initial action, they are no more adequate in a subse-
quent malpractice action where the same issues must first be
litigated.
The onerous combination of the shift away from the focal issue
and the increased burden of proof in a malpractice action warrants a
reevaluation of the adequacy of this remedy. Moreover, the cost of
an additional lawsuit may be prohibitive. Even more compelling is a
case where the remedy is, as a practical matter, nonexistent. 08 The
offending attorney may be insolvent or otherwise judgment-proof. In
such a case, the innocent client is left without a remedy.
F. Judicial Economy and the Principle of Finality
Some courts, while recognizing that a party's failure to meet a
Supp. at 1289.
105. Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255 (1977).
106. St. John v. Tepper, 387 N.Y.2d 457, 54 A.2d 712 (1976); Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335
Pa. Super. 599, 485 A.2d 56 (1984); Allied Prods., Inc. v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 232
S.E.2d 774 (1977).
107. Pashak v. Barish, 303 Pa. Super. 559, 450 A.2d 67 (1982).
108. See, e.g., Seybert v. Robert Lee Pontiac, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
See supra note 44 for a general discussion of this case.
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1986
prescribed standard is the fault of the party's attorney, still pay
homage to the notion of judicial economy, 0 9 the result of which is to
directly penalize not the attorney, but his client. Courts often em-
phasize that there exists a principle of finality in proceedings which
must be recognized and given effect."10 That principle dictates that
litigation must eventually be ended and that at some point the pre-
vailing party must be allowed to rely on the inviolability of his judg-
ment."' A major purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b), 2 while permitting relief when warranted, is to buttress the
finality of judgments. It achieves this purpose by providing for post-
judgment relief only under exceptional circumstances." 3
Concern for the finality of judgments is not a sufficient reason
for denying relief to a deserving client. Though a party has the right
to rely on a decree of the court, in reality there is no difference be-
tween a motion or appeal based on attorney misfeasance, and one
based on any other proposed justification for relief. In either case,
the opposing party occupies the same position. The judgment is bind-
ing until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. When consid-
ering cases lost or dismissed because of an attorney's conduct, how-
ever, the fact that the judgment was rendered other than on the
merits must also be remembered. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of vacating a judgment so that cases may be decided on their
merits."
Judicial efficiency is sometimes cited as another reason for not
allowing a litigant to raise misfeasance of counsel as grounds for re-
lief. One federal court has held that "[i]n recognizing the relative
hardship upon [the client] as distinguished from counsel, it must be
kept in mind that . . . courts cannot function efficiently unless they
can effectively require compliance with reasonable rules. Absence of
meaningful power to require that compliance would make for disor-
der and preclude effective judicial administration."" 5 Further, the
109. See. e.g., Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, 107 Idaho 1, 684 P.2d 978 (1984) (courts
cannot function efficiently unless they can effectively require compliance with reasonable
rules).
110. United Imports & Exports v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 43, 45, 653 P.2d 691, 693
(1982).
Ill. See Jansson v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 198 N.J. Super. 190, 486 A.2d 920
(1985).
112. See supra note 61.
113. Lynch v. Meridian Hills Studio Apts., Inc., 491 A.2d 515 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985).
See supra note 69.
114. Moore v. Emmanuel Family Training Center, 18 Ohio St.3d 64, 479 N.E.2d 879
(1985).
115. Chism v. Nat'l Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981).
ATTORNEY MISFEASANCE
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that to give a
party a second chance would increase the burden on other litigants
in the system, as well as on our already overtaxed courts."16
Increasing the efficiency of the judicial system is an admirable
goal, and it is of course desirable that the congestion of court dockets
be reduced in every way possible. "But that laudable objective
should not be sought in a way which undercuts the very purposes for
which courts were created - that is, to try cases on their merits and
render judgments in accordance with the substantial rights of the
parties.' 7 By sacrificing litigants' rights to reduce court congestion,
courts are attempting "to promote speed in administration, which is
desirable, at the expense of justice which is indispensible to any
court system worthy of its name." '" 8 Moreover, such a sacrifice may
not achieve the intended benefit as Justice Black noted in his dissent
in Link:
[A]ny attempt to cut down on court congestion by dismissing
meritorious lawsuits is doomed to fail even in its misguided pur-
pose of promoting speed in judicial administration. Litigants
with meritorious lawsuits are not likely to accept unfair rulings
of that kind without exhausting all appellate remedies. Conse-
quently, any reduction of trial court dockets accomplished by
such dismissals will be more than offset by the increased burden
on appellate courts. 19
Dismissal will force the client to institute another action, this
time for legal malpractice. As shown above, the original issues will
have to be litigated anyway as part of the malpractice proceedings,
but without the benefit of all of the evidence. As a practical matter,
there is no reduction in time spent on the case by courts, and the
second action, with all its inherent delay, will actually increase the
burden on courts. Moreover, all the preparation for the first trial will
be wasted.
G. Sanctions Against Attorneys
As an alternative to harsh sanctions aimed at the innocent cli-
ent, the courts can impose sanctions directly on the errant attor-
ney.' 20 When attorneys have appeared in proceedings and are before
116. Lynch, 491 A.2d 515.
117. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 648 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 648-49 (Black, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 649 (Black, J., dissenting).
120. Schwarz v. United States, 384 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1967) (court can impose substan-
tial costs and attorney's fees payable by offending counsel personally to the opposing party);
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a court, that court has the power to impose upon them an obligation
to pay costs when they are guilty of neglect or some other form of
delinquency in the performance of their obligations to their client
and the court.' A lawyer does not have to be guilty of contempt for
the court to penalize him. The power of courts to sanction attorneys
for tactics or actions which are frivolous or which cause delay is sep-
arate and distinct from the power of courts to punish for acts of
contempt. 2
In some states, the legislatures have indicated their approval of
sanctions against attorneys as one method of increasing the efficiency
of the courts. For example, in response to a California Supreme
Court ruling 28 that the imposition on an attorney of the fees of op-
posing counsel as a sanction for misconduct was not within the equi-
table power or supervisory role of the court, the legislature enacted a
new section to the Code of Civil Procedure 2 " granting the court
such power. 12 5 The purpose of imposing costs is to deter disruptive
practices that contribute to inefficiency in the court system.
Courts, however, do not need legislative approval to impose
sanctions on attorneys. Judges "have inherent power to do whatever
may be done under the general principles of jurisprudence to insure
to the citizen a fair trial, whenever his life, liberty, property or char-
acter is at stake."'1 6 The power of a court over members of the bar is
at least as great as its authority over litigants.1
2 7
H. Prejudice to the Opposing Party
The majority in Link stated that keeping a "suit alive merely
because plaintiff should not be penalized for the omissions of his own
Moscatiello v. Savarese, 42 A.D.2d 519, 344 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1973) (imposition of costs on
counsel personally was a more appropriate remedy than dismissal).
121. Kimple v. Auble, 87 Misc.2d 997, 386 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1976).
122. In re Gumabao v. Gumabao, 150 Cal. App.3d 572, 198 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1984).
123. Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal.3d 626, 586 P.2d 942, 150 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1978).
124. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE Section 128.5 (West 1982) provides in pertinent part:
Frivolous actions or delaying tactics; order for payment of expenses
(a) Every trial court shall have the power to order a party or the party's
attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees in-
curred by another party as a result of tactics or actions not based on good faith
which are frivolous or which cause unnecessary delay . ...
125. 1981 Cal. Stats. 2, c. 762 provides: "It is the intent of this legislation to broaden
the powers of trial courts to manage their calendars and provide for the expeditious processing
of civil actions by authorizing monetary sanctions not now presently authorized by the inter-
pretation of the law in Baugess v. Paine. [citation omitted]"
126. Crocker v. Justices of the Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 179, 94 N.E. 369, 377
(1911).
127. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Beit v. Probate and Family
Court Dept., 385 Mass. 854, 434 N.E.2d 642 (1982).
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attorney would be visiting the sins of the plaintiff's lawyer upon the
defendant.' 12 Further, various courts have held that if anyone must
lose because of the neglect of a lawyer, it should be the party who
employed that lawyer as his counsel, 129 and that as a general pro-
position, the client, not the adversary or the court, must bear respon-
sibility for retaining counsel who failed to understand the rules of
the court.' 30
The underlying premise is that there is only one place to put the
responsibility for the misfeasance of counsel - on the client who
hired him. This ignores the realities of the attorney-client relation-
ship, as well as the obligation of the court to supervise the conduct of
litigation. Lawyers, as officers of the courts, are subject to the super-
visory powers of the courts. "In the exercise of these powers, courts
have a responsibility to the client, to the profession, and to the public
at large to make and enforce rules which promote excellence in the
practice of law and recognize the distinctive rights and obligations of
the lawyer-client relationship." '' The loss should fall not on the in-
nocent parties, but on the attorney at fault.
In the absence of demonstrable prejudice to the other party, it is
neither necessary nor proper to visit the sins of the attorney on his
blameless client.'32 When courts state that it would seem unfair and
harsh to penalize the other side in the litigation by requiring him to
again present his cause to another jury in a new trial, 33 they over-
look an important factor. If the aggrieved client was not adequately
represented in that action, the merits and issues of the case have not
truly been heard and the other side may have received an undeserved
windfall. The fact that a party's initial victory may be placed in
jeopardy does not alone constitute prejudice to his rights. If this was
considered prejudicial, then any appeal or post-judgment motion to
set aside a decision or to seek a new trial must also be considered
prejudicial.
If counsel's error resulted in expenses to the opposing party, the
court may assess those expenses against counsel. Such an assessment
would not infringe the general rule that costs are not assessable
against a party in the absence of an enabling statute.1 84 Rather, the
128. Link, 370 U.S. at 390 (emphasis in original).
129. Sargent Feed and Grain Co. v. Anderson, 216 Neb. 421, 344 N.W.2d 59 (1984).
130. Lynch, 491 A.2d at 520.
131. Allied Prod. Inc., v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 767, 232 S.E.2d 774, 777 (1977)
(Poff, J., dissenting).
132. Jansson v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 198 N.J. Super. 190, 486 A.2d 920 (1985).
133. Maltby v. Cox Constr. Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979).
134. Coburn v. Domanosky, 257 Pa. Super. 474, 390 A.2d 1335 (1978).
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assessment would represent an exercise of the court's inherent power
to conduct its business in an orderly manner, by taking such action
against an attorney as may be necessary.
I. Civil/Criminal Distinction
A large number of cases concerning the meaning and necessity
of the effective assistance of counsel involve criminal cases or post-
conviction proceedings arising out of criminal cases. Of course, in
these cases there is a Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel.1"
Under the Fourteenth Amendment,' " a defendant in a state crimi-
nal case may not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel
without offending due process.137 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
has noted:
A civil suit presents far different considerations. There is no ex-
press constitutional guarantee of representation by counsel in a
civil matter. Unlike many criminal defendants who are repre-
sented by court-appointed counsel, parties in a civil action retain
counsel of their choice. In a criminal case, a defendant's liberty
is at stake, and the prosecutorial force of the state is involved.
While potentially involving large sums of money, a civil matter
is not penal in nature, and the state is not generally involved. 8'
The statement that incompetence of counsel may be a ground
for nullifying a judgment in a criminal case but not in a civil matter
is too broad and inclusive. The purpose of all court proceedings is to
do justice. "If the processes have so clearly gone awry that an injus-
tice has resulted, the court in charge of the trial, or [the] court on
review, should rectify such an unfortunate occurrence, whether the
proceeding is criminal or civil." 139 In determining whether relief
should be granted, the matter of critical concern should not be the
nature of the proceeding, but whether there is such a strong likeli-
135. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which districts shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
136. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
137. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
138. Village of Big Bend v. Anderson, 103 Wis.2d 403, 405, 308 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Ct.
App. 1981).
139. Maltby v. Cox Constr. Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336, 341 (Utah 1979) (Crockett, C.J.,
concurring with reservation).
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hood that an injustice has resulted that good conscience requires that
injustice be remedied.
140
The accuracy of the statement that a client in a civil action re-
tains counsel of his choice is questionable. " The public, as a whole,
is uneducated regarding the professional abilities of individual law-
yers. There is widespread lack of informed choice. While a civil case
is not state action in the traditional sense, the state is nonetheless
involved. The judiciary is a branch of government " 2 and attorneys
are licensed by states." 3 Arguably, the client's lawsuit is his prop-
erty and it appears that courts are parties to the unfair taking of
that property. Public confidence in the legal system suffers when it is
perceived that courts cannot be relied upon to provide impartial
forums.
III. Recommendations
Dismissals or other sanctions directed against clients for mis-
conduct attributable to lawyers invariably penalize the innocent and
inadequately punish the blameworthy. Strict adherence to the
"agency theory" should be eliminated as a method of handling these
cases. When the client has not personally misbehaved and his oppo-
nent in the litigation will not be prejudiced, the interests of justice
are better served by vindicating the judicial process through an ap-
propriate action against the lawyer, while allowing the abused client
a hearing on the merits of his case." This would adequately protect
the public from future imposition. Courts can and should shift their
emphasis from the action or inaction of counsel to an examination of
the activities and positions of the parties themselves.
Lawyer misfeasance should be weighed along with several other
relevant factors in determining whether to grant a client relief. The
appropriate remedy depends on the facts of each case and the ag-
grieved client's desires. 1" Proper exercise of discretion in determin-
ing whether an error of counsel will preclude hearing a case on its
140. Maltby, 598 P.2d 336.
141. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
142. Crocker, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N.E. 369. "Our system of government has created the
executive, the legislative, and the judicial, as the three independent and coordinate depart-
ments ... ." Id. at 179, 94 N.E. at 377.
143. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
144. Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
145. Some examples of appropriate relief are: the admission of evidence previously sup-
pressed; the reinstatement of a dismissed case; the extension of a time limit for filing papers
with the court; a reversal of the original cause on appeal; and reimbursement of money spent
on inadequate representation.
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merits requires balanced consideration of all facets of the proceed-
ing. These include merit or lack of merit of the action, seriousness of
injury to all parties, potential prejudice to other parties and intent or
lack of intent to default or abandon the action deliberately.
4
The following four-pronged test is proposed for use by the
courts in determining the prudence of granting relief to a client who
has been wronged by his lawyer:
(1) the presence of attorney misfeasance;""'
(2) the presence of a meritorious claim or defense;
(3) the presence of diligence by the aggrieved client; and
(4) lack of prejudice to the opposing party.
If all four prongs are satisfied, relief should be granted to the client.
This test will enable courts to eliminate the present inequities in
handling claims of lawyer misfeasance, while at the same time mini-
mizing the harm to all parties and increasing the efficiency of the
judicial system. It will not supplant the discretion of the courts, but,
rather, will provide guidelines within which the courts can work. The
test is intentionally flexible so that courts are free to exercise their
own judgment. It is designed to foster the use of judicial discretion
rather than the mere mechanical application of strict guidelines. It is
in effect a balancing test.
The first three prongs are fairly straightforward. The threshold
question is whether there has in fact been misfeasance. In making
this determination, courts should not make a value judgment as to
the worthiness of relief for the act in question. Rather, courts should
satisfy themselves that one party's attorney has jeopardized the
rights of that party. The whole concept of excusable and inexcusable
neglect should be disregarded when looking solely at the conduct of
the attorney.
The second prong requires courts to make a determination that
the aggrieved party does in fact have a valid case. Courts should not
actually decide the factual or legal issues involved, but should deter-
mine whether a valid controversy exists. This provides the opportu-
nity to minimize occasions of abuse by weeding out frivolous claims.
Courts should also consider the effect that the attorney's conduct
had on the outcome of the trial. It is well within the discretion of
courts to determine that any error was in fact harmless, and that the
146. LaBuda v. Brookhaven Memorial Hosp. Medical Center, 98 A.D.2d 711, 469
N.Y.S.2d 112 (1983); Mineroff v. R.H. Macey's & Co., 97 A.D.2d 535, 467 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1983).
147. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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result would have been the same regardless of the attorney's
conduct.
The third prong addresses the responsibility of each party to re-
main diligent in prosecuting or defending his action. It must be
remembered that it is the client's case. He must, therefore, continue
to take an active role in it. It is here that the concepts of excusable
and inexcusable neglect have a place. Any inexcusable dereliction by
the client is enough to justify a denial of relief. In making this deter-
mination, courts must recognize the complexity of the judicial sys-
tem and the relative lack of legal sophistication on the part of the
general populace.
If the first three prongs are satisfied, the fourth is used to bal-
ance the inequities. Courts should first determine whether prejudice
to the opposing parties exists. The courts will again make a discre-
tionary judgment as to its presence and severity. If prejudice is lack-
ing, relief should be granted. The converse, however, is not necessa-
rily true. Even when prejudice may result, relief may be granted
depending upon the circumstances of each case. Courts should bal-
ance the hardships, keeping in mind various alternatives to reduce,
or even eliminate, prejudice.
One solution is to impose monetary sanctions directly on the er-
rant attorney. Sanctions serve several important purposes. The direct
payments to the opposing party can eliminate the expense incurred
by that party in the prosecution or defense of the lawsuit. Through
payments to the court, administrative costs can be recovered. In both
cases, the sanctions will have significant deterrent effects.
The problem of attorney misfeasance, however, can be dealt
with before it creates the need to consider acceptable remedies.
Courts could notify a party when the courts perceive obvious attor-
ney misfeasance. Of course, this option will not be feasible in every
instance, but certainly it will be available in cases of blatant dilatory
conduct.148 It is far better in the administration of justice, and far
more realistic in light of the true relationship between a lawyer and
his client, to warn the client that the threat of penalty hangs over his
head. Such a rule would do nothing more than incorporate basic con-
stitutional requirements of fairness into the administration of justice
in this country." 9 "Why should a client be awakened to his lawyer's
incapacity for the first time by a sudden brutal pronouncement of
148. This may be burdensome on the courts, but of course, courts need not use this
procedure except in extreme cases.
149. Link, 370 U.S. at 648.
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the court: 'Your lawyer has failed to perform his duty in prosecuting
your case and we are therefore throwing you out of court on your
heels'?, 1 50
IV. Conclusion
Attorney misfeasance is a serious problem in our judicial sys-
tem. The problem lies not only in numbers, but in perception. A lay-
man is at the mercy of his attorney. The public's general ignorance
of legal principals and procedures results in complete dependence
upon the assistance of counsel. If this assistance is lacking, unde-
served disaster may befall the client. When this occurs, not only is
that lawyer's professional reputation discredited, but respect for the
entire legal profession diminishes. Recognizing this reality is the first
step in the process of restoring the public's faith in the legal system.
The inequities resulting from blind adherence to antiquated and
illogical doctrines can and must be avoided. By applying a practical
rather than a mechanical approach to attorney misfeasance, justice
will be achieved without significant detriment to the system. To in-
spire the public's confidence in the American legal system, courts
must eliminate the perception that the lawyer in the black robe is
protecting the lawyer in the three-piece suit at the expense of the
public.
Matthew Chabal, III
150. Id. at 646-47.
